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The Bridge at Remagen: A German-American Staff Ride to Study Its Capture

Billy A. Arthur and Bruce H. Siemon

Just a little over forty years ago, on March 7, 1945, U.S. Army 2d Lt. Emmet J. Burrows and his company commander, 1st Lt. Karl H. Timmerman, stood on a hill overlooking the German resort town of Remagen and thrilled at what they saw. Far below them and off to the right, clearly visible up the Rhine gorge in the haze, stood the Ludendorff Bridge, still intact, spanning the last major barrier between the advancing Allies and the heartland of the Third Reich. Allied planners had not dared hope for an intact bridge across the Rhine. When they got this one, it was not as a result of a battle in any real sense, but rather of a military accident. As a military breakthrough, it was more psychological than strategic—an exhilarating morale-booster for the Americans and devastatingly demoralizing for the Germans. As German generals repeatedly told U.S. Army historian S.L.A. Marshall after the war, "Remagen killed us. How could it have happened? We are a military people. We are not that careless."

Forty years later, West Germans and Americans are friends and allies cooperating in a wide variety of fields—one of them that of military history. This past May, two U.S. Army historians, together with seven U.S. Army officers, joined 150 German Army officers and NCOs to study what did happen around Remagen on the ground where the history was made. Called a military historical terrain study, the project was sponsored by the German Heeresamt (Army Office), an organization having no exact counterpart in the U.S. Army but which would roughly correspond to a Department of the Army-level agency combining the Training and Doctrine and Army Materiel Commands. The Heeresamt invited American participation to tell the story of the capture of the bridge from the other side of the hill—in this case, ours.

Maj. Gen. Charles J. Fiala, U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), Chief of Staff, approved cooperation of the command's Military History Office in the project. Even at the earliest stages of the planning, it was clear that there were enormous gains to be made from such a project, combining as it would the military history assets of two of the highest allied headquarters in Europe.

The principal gain would be the opportunity afforded the participants in the conference to analyze the operations of both opposing forces at Remagen in terms of tactics and terrain. Secondly, the project would contribute to interoperability between American and German forces. "Interoperability," a buzzword of the 1970s, is defined as the capability of one armed force to interchange services with the armed forces of other allied nations. It has been a fact of life in the NATO alliance for the last ten years, but it had not played such a formal role in military history education in Europe until the Remagen project. Occasionally, American and German sister units in the USAREUR Partnership Program have done combined staff rides over European battlefields under the direction of their own chains of command and with the technical assistance of the USAREUR Military History Office, but the Remagen project was the first time that professional U.S. Army historians were directly involved.

See **Remagen**, p. 4

Ludendorff Bridge from atop Erpeler Ley. (U.S. Army photo)

EDITOR'S JOURNAL

We round off two years of *The Army Historian* with this, the eighth quarterly issue. This time, Billy Arthur and Bruce Siemon provide a lead article showing how for a relatively small investment in resources a history office is able to demontrate to the military community the immediate value of history to professional development. Terrain walks are proliferating throughout the Army now, as commanders and teachers find new relevance in learning about old battles on the ground where they were fought. Readers who have been with us for a while will remember William Glenn Robertson's fine piece on staff rides at the Command and General Staff College in the Winter 1984 issue. We'll be happy to provide copies on request to those who missed it. As with the use of military history detachments, methods of advancing professionalism through unit history programs, and applications of "the new military history," staff rides are an area where we're beginning to accomplish what we set out to do with this periodical: generate a real exchange of ideas on how history can serve the Army.

Although *The Army Historian* does not feature book reviews, I would like to make a brief aside on a valuable addition to the literature of the profession of arms. Presidio Press has published a book called *Platoon Leader*, by James R. McDonough. The dust jacket has the typical recommendation from an authority in the field. This particular authority is Charles B. MacDonald, an old friend, outstanding military historian, and Center alumnus. "I have waited for someone to do for the platoon leader what I tried thirty-eight years ago to do for the company commander," he writes. "Now James McDonough has not only done it; he has done it in a way that cannot be beat. It will become a classic." This is not just dust jacket hype. McDonough has written an extremely valuable book on basic leadership which should become a primer for company grade officers entering a new command.

Perhaps the book particularly appealed to me because I could follow my own experiences as a replacement officer taking command of a weapons platoon which had participated in the Normandy landings. McDonough's work once again drives home the fact that although the lessons of our great (and, in this case, little) captains cannot fully replace actual combat experience, the study of operations and the examples of leadership provides the best possible substitute. And in my case, at least, Lieutenant McDonough's experiences in taking command were close enough to what I had encountered in Normandy to convince me of the timelessness of the principles of leadership.

B.E.K.

The ARMY HISTORIAN

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Call for Articles

The Army Historian is seeking articles of from 300 to 2,500 words for publication in future issues. Articles on such topics as Army historical activities, current research, the uses of military history and its position in the Army, past commanders' use of history, military historiography, programs promoting historical mindedness, and professional reading are being considered. Accepted submissions are edited for clarity and suitability, but every effort is made to preserve the authors' individual styles. Where possible, photographic prints related to the articles would be very helpful, and will be returned to authors of accepted manuscripts upon request. Manuscripts should be doublespaced, in two copies, accompanied by a daytime telephone number and a brief description of the writer's current position, and sent to Managing Editor, *The Army Historian*, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20314-0200.

CHIEF'S BULLETIN

William A. Stofft

It is a great honor to have been named the U.S. Army's Chief of Military History. The Center of Military History is, as it has always been, a true center of excellence in the study of our Army's past and of the profession of arms.

This is, moreover, an excellent time to be involved in military history in the Army. There is a determined effort underway to provide Army leaders with the legitimate "laboratory of war" critical to the systematic and progressive development of clear-thinking and resolute battle captains. The Army has come to realize that just as history is the memory of mankind, military history is the memory of our profession.

At no time since World War II has there been stronger support or more creative energy committed to the systematic study and use of military history in the Army. The study of our professional past is flourishing in the Army's schools, in its units, its staffs, and elsewhere. Each month, several historical staff rides and battlefield tours are being conducted in the United States and overseas. Celebrations and memorializations of the American Army's proud battle heritage occur somewhere almost daily. The number of historical inquiries coming to the Center from soldiers and the general public has almost doubled in the last year, many of them originating in new Army units with substantial heritages of their own—the Aviation Branch, the 75th Rangers, the 10th Mountain Division, and the 35th Infantry Division, to name a few. Both the Army National Guard and the United States Army Reserve have strong military history detachments now numbering almost 20, supplementing the efforts of the Army's only active duty MHD at Forces Command. The Center's involvement in the 1985 Military History Detachment Training Workshop, held at Carlisle Barracks this past July, is indicative of the emphasis we plan to place on this crucial aspect of the Army's historical efforts.

All this activity is the direct result of the convergence of two important forces: enlightened senior Army leadership by men of vision and the efforts of Army historians. Secretary Marsh, General Wickham, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations Lt. Gen. Carl Vuono, and commanding generals of Major Commands around the globe have understood clearly the complex nature of history and have appreciated the significance to the Army of its serious study and application. Over the past two decades, a small but incredibly gifted, productive, and selfless group of soldier and civilian scholars has dedicated itself to training Army leaders, to teaching, and to writing about America's proud military past. Army historians have accomplished this meticulous, mostly anonymous and unsung task brilliantly. They have often done the job on their own initiatives, out of dedication to their profession and to the Army. The task was accomplished because the players knew it was right and decided to get on with it.

I have thought a great deal about the responsibilities my new position carries with it and I accept them fully. We at the Center must bring the past to life by bringing life to the past, making military history work for our Army and for the nation. This is what the Center has been doing for decades and what it will continue to do. We will record the Army's official history to determine for the record what happened, how it happened, and why it happened. We will continue to anticipate the needs of Army leaders and to respond energetically. We will continue to preserve, protect, and make available our Army's material and cultural heritage—its technology, art, and literature. We will assist in the training and education of Army leaders in the art and science of war—not to the glory of war, but because the study of military history is integral to the intellectual dimension indepensible to the true profession of arms. Finally, we will continue to recognize a legitimate constituency outside the army and respond to it, as well. The Army has played a prominent role in the evolution of the Republic from its earliest days, and the record of that participation is important.

I have joined an active and vital organization, one that is mature, purposeful, and well-focused, and one that was splendidly led since November 1984 by Col. Patrick Holland. Our task now is quite simply to place military history at the service of the Army—to be timely, thorough, responsive, and true to the sources. I am committed to this effort and in it for the long haul.

Promotions at USMA

The President has nominated and the Senate has confirmed Col. Roy K. Flint to the post of Dean of the Academic Board, United States Military Academy. With the position comes the rank of Brigadier General. General Flint, who had held the post of Professor and Head of the Academy's Department of History, assumed his new position on August 1. Concurrently, Lt. Col. Robert A. Doughty, Professor and Deputy Head of the Department of History, was promoted to Colonel and assumed the post of Professor and Head of the Department. The promotions come to two of the country's most dedicated officer-historians and auger well for history at West Point and in the Army. Their colleagues at the Center extend hearty congratulations.

Remagen, From p. 1

At the operational level, interoperability came into play long before anyone set foot on the Remagen terrain. Although virtually all German officers in the Heeresamt understand English, it was requested that the U.S. briefings be in German to facilitate higher comprehension. As a result, the American side chose German-speaking officers to attend, and manuscripts—not just briefing papers—had to be prepared for the translators. All of this made the job more time-consuming than it would have been otherwise, and required careful planning and additional resources. To preclude duplication and to ensure that presentations from both sides would dovetail, a number of preliminary meetings were held and outlines exchanged. Finally, a dress rehearsal was run the day before the operation to check everything from bus routes to the Rhine ferry schedules.

Planned as an all-day program, the terrain walk began at 0800 hours in an auditorium at the Heeresamt compound in Cologne. German briefers there provided an overview of the strategic/operational situation as of early-March 1945 as seen from the German perspective, and showed a film on American and German operations during the push to the Rhine in February-March. Similarly, the USAREUR briefing at the Heeresamt compound outlined the overall organizational structure of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force; summarized strategic planning as of early March; and introduced the players, from Eisenhower through Montgomery and Bradley on down to Lieutenant Timmerman, the commander of A Company, 27th Armored Infantry Battalion, the unit that actually first saw the bridge and subsequently put the first American soldiers across the Rhine.

From the Heeresamt compound the party traveled in buses some twenty-five miles south to a field approximately 1,000 meters south of Gelsdorf overlooking the Ahr valley. Here the German briefers discussed the local operational situation and the defenses the Wehrmacht had available in the area. The USAREUR briefing team outlined 9th Armored Division's plans, the misson of Task Force Engemann of Combat Command B which spearheaded the drive to Remagen, and pointed out the villages along the route Meckenheim-Adendorf-Arzdorf-Fritzdorf visible in the distance to the north.

Because of road construction, it was not possible to follow the exact route Task Force Engemann took from Meckenheim to Remagen. Bypassing the section of the road from Meckenheim via Adendorf and Arzdorf, the four buses transporting the participants picked up the route at Fritzdorf, and from there followed the precise roads Timmerman's A Company took through Oeverich, Leimersdorf, and Birresdorf toward Remagen. On each bus a guide



Bruce Siemon, Billy Arthur, and a German NCO outline the 9th Armored Division's concept of operations in the field south of Gelsdorf. (Courtesy Heeresamt)

explained the events that took place at various points along the route as A Company raced for the Rhine.

The historical explanations took on substance at such places as the next stop, a country inn called the Waldschlösschen, situated at a point on the road just before the sharp bend leading to the hillside from which Lieutenants Burrows and Timmerman first looked down on the Rhine and found the bridge still standing. It was at the Waldschlösschen that Timmerman asked a shocked proprietress, Frau Allmang—in perfect German—for details of the enemy. The Allmang children became the source of the famous poisoned food story. As Timmerman left the inn, he ordered that food and medicine be brought to the family's sickly children, but the Allmangs would not eat it for fear it was poisoned. Later, the tables were turned when Timmerman's men made well-meaning Germans taste captured wine before they would drink it. The latter-day staff-riders relished such colorful stories, as they did the many incidental facts that turned up—for example that the Allmang family still owns the Waldschlösschen.

Near the inn, in the small clearing where the American officers first looked down upon the valley and the bridge, the next series of briefings was presented. For the German side, the presentations detailed the defenses of Remagen and the preparations to destroy the bridge; for the U.S. side, the sighting of the bridge, actions taken up the chain of command, and the approach through Remagen to the bridge, itself, were covered.

The actual bridge, of course, is long since gone, but the bridge towers on both sides of the Rhine could be clearly seen from the spot where the briefings were given, and it was easy for the participants to imagine the Americans' sensations on that long-ago March morning when they saw that the span was still standing and realized they would have to attempt to cross it. From that vantage point, the group moved down to the bridge towers on the Remagen side, site for the next set of briefings. For the German side, there was a technical discussion of the engineer preparations for the destruction of the bridge and the efforts taken to bring it down; for the American side, the briefing dealt with the decision to cross,the firefight at the town square, and the actual crossing.

From Remagen, the buses crossed the river by ferry to Linz and drove to the top of the Erpeler Ley, the sugar-loaf block of basaltic lava overlooking the bridge site on the Rhine's right bank. The Germans' briefings on the mountain covered Wehrmacht attempts to destroy the bridge and dislodge the bridgehead, while the USAREUR briefing addressed the expansion of the bridgehead and the massive antiaircraft defenses established to protect it.

Following a lunch served on the mountaintop from a German Army field kitchen, the group returned to Remagen for a concluding session in the auditorium of the local high school. Here there were some introductory remarks by the mayor of Remagen, who has established in the bridge towers a museum dedicated to peace. He was followed by a jurist from the Heeresamt's legal staff, who outlined the provisions of German law and Wehrmacht regulations in effect in the spring of 1945, demonstrating that the courts-martial of the German officers held responsible for the loss of the bridge were, even then, completely illegal. Finally, there was a session on lessions learned, keyed to the provisions of current German Army doctrinal manuals.

The view from above Remagen in May 1985.

As far as the USAREUR Military History Office is concerned, the most valuable lesson learned from the terrain walk was that operations of this sort are not only viable approaches to international cooperation in military history education, but highly effective ones. Having representatives of formerly opposing sides present the action from their different perpectives provides a dynamic interplay that clearly heightens audience interest. There may, to be sure, be differences in interpretation, or even in "the facts." (U.S. antiaircraft units, for example, reported shooting down all German attackers on March 8, while the German record shows that only eight of ten attacking aircraft were lost.) But such contradictions are themselves part of the learning process, graphically demonstrating how difficult it can be to penetrate the fog of war. The real value of this type of historical exercise is, of course, to the officer and NCO participants. Having seen in the case of Remagen how quick decisions combined with terrain to bring about an event of far-reaching consequences, they will be prepared to look on a similar situation using history as their guide.

Bruce Siemon is Chief Historian and Billy Arthur a historian in the USAREUR Military History Office, Heidelberg, West Germany.

THE COMMANDER AND MILITARY HISTORY

The Living Legacy of Unit History

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

Attu. Kwajalein. Leyte. Okinawa. The names conjure up images of American soldiers in amphibious assaults, from the frozen wastes of Aleutian tundra to the rugged forests of the Ryukyus. To most people with the interest, these battles are found only in the inanimate pages of books and yellowed combat journals. But to the soldiers of the 32d Infantry regiment, they are living history, personified by veterans of the 32d who invited them to their recent reunion.

The 1st, 2d, and 3d Battalions of today's 32d Infantry, now comprising the 2d Brigade of the 7th Infantry Division (Light), are the lineal descendants of the old 32d's Companies A, B, and C. Veterans of the landings at the 32d's reunion included no less than five World War II battalion commanders, a regimental executive officer, a regimental surgeon, and the commander of the first company to hit the beaches at Leyte. The current brigade commander and I gave the group and their guests a slide presentation on the history of the regiment, and presented each veteran with a 7th Infantry Division patch, unit crest (distinctive unit insignia), and other momentos. Not a very complicated activity, but out of it developed an outstanding rapport between veteran and current members of the unit. The relationship is being sustained, with local veterans regularly contacting the active-duty headquarters and providing materials for the regimental museum and a regimental history now being compiled.

These veterans have reincarnated their battles from the history books. They have vividly recreated the sights, smells, and emotions—the human elements—of combat. Their recollections have immeasurably contributed to the 32d's esprit de corps and to building a sense of community in the unit—an important part of the regimental concept in the Army's New Manning System. One recent Army study held that an objective of the New Manning System "is to capitalize upon the most distinguished regimental colors to obtain the support of living veterans and to further enhance among younger soldiers the spirit of belonging." The 32d Infantry is taking advantage of this irreplaceable human resource, to the benefit of both the veterans and the active-duty soldiers.

Other units can do what the 32d has done in establishing continuing contacts between past and present members of the regiment. An excellent starting place is to write to the Community Relations Division, Office of the Chief of Public Affairs, Department of the Army, Washington, DC 20310, which maintains a current list of all known veterans' associations.

Thanks to the veterans, the past is alive and well for the soldiers of the 32d Infantry. Even the youngest members of the unit are finding in history relevance to their daily lives. Now campaign streamers like "Aleutian Islands" and "Eastern Mandates" are something more, much more, than strips of multicolored cloth attached to the regimental colors.

Captain Raugh serves as Adjutant of the 2d Brigade, 7th Infantry Division (Light), at Ford Ord, California.

2d Brigade commander Col. John D. Howard and the author (uniformed, left and right) with regimental veterans and families.

PERSPECTIVE

Historians and the Defense Policymakers

Benjamin Franklin Cooling

The Army Historian continues here its series of guest contributions on the state of military history. Dr. Cooling, formerly Assistant Director for Historical Services, U.S. Army Military History Institute, currently serves as Chief, Special Histories Branch, and Senior Historian for Contract Programs in the Office of Air Force History, Washington, DC.

In 1947, Army Chief of Staff and subsequent Secretary of State George C. Marshall told a *New York Times* reporter that, "I have felt in our dealing with Congress that one of our greatest troubles is the limitation in the knowledge of what has happened in the past." Each generation of public officials verbally genuflects toward history and then seems promptly to violate its tenents in action. Today, we are told, we have a better-educated, better-informed body of fellow citizens governing us. Yet a critical task facing all historians involved with the public sector remains how to ensure that governing bodies do not misapply—through quasi-knowledge—the lessons of the past. This is especially true in defense-related matters, where in the face of slogans growing out of half-learned history—"no more Versailles," "no more Munichs," "no more Koreas," "no more Vietnams,"—public historians confront a possibly imponderable and irresolvable challenge. In what ways, it therefore seems reasonable to ask, can history be more effectively used by the defense establishment? Are there reasons to doubt, it may be added, that there can actually be a juncture of history and policy in the defense area?

Let me state simply at the outset that my responses to these questions are a product of more than twenty years of work with the Federal government, most of which has passed with the historical programs of the U.S. Army and Air Force. Like most civil servants, I become less sanguine of genuine accomplishment as the years pass. But meanwhile, one must labor in the vineyards, ever mindful of the need to strive for an innovative breakthrough or a new approach for countering the infidels.

History in the Defense Establishment

Perhaps this mildly jaundiced Department of Defense historian will be pardoned for alluding to some commentary Tom Shales of *The Washington Post* once made about history and television. Noting how sad it seemed that the selling of history to the viewing public was such a back-breaking task, Shales observed that "usually it has to be hoked up as a multigenerational mini-series with all kinds of soap opera slop." The defense community, too, it sometimes appears to the defense historian, exhibits a passion for homogenized historical pap—some quick-fix, simplified view of a narrow slice of a much larger and more complex problem. The defense community seems to want nothing to do with variables, human foibles, or the historical milieu of contextual time and place. Holistic studies are not the Pentagon's cup of tea. Yet ironically, history seems alive and well in the defense establishment. If the past decade is any indication, the wholesale escalation of military history education, the maturation of more balanced service historical programs and and an increase in the number of historian slots on tables of organization, as well as almost constant talk about "the value of history" suggest that major strides have been taken. None of this, however, even when combined with a modest increase in civilian academic interest and participation in military history, should suggest that history's relation to policymaking has been improved. Quantity—of programs, slots, or words—does not automatically guarantee quality or embracement. Putting it another way, we cannot be sure that history in the present defense environment is "the right kind of history," but then we may never know whether it is nor not. One may not be far wrong in guessing that the whole business defies quantification and objective analysis. Undeniably, however, historical awareness is up—especially among uniformed members of the defense community. What they do with it may be another matter altogether.

It may be that the defense community is at present using history as much as it is at present intellectually capable of using it, given its mindsets, its proclivity for action over reflection, and the state of the government's historical programs themselves. My perspective must be from the service historical programs; those of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff may be different. At any rate, the Army, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps have all tried to shape responsive historical programs at both field and headquarters levels. One may quibble about the precise content of military history courses in service schools from West Point to the War College, but the fact is that what is there now is quantitatively and qualitatively better than

what was there a decade ago. One may question why it takes so long for those blue, brown, and green buckram official histories to emerge from service historical offices, or why so much work has to be done only "for the files" due to security classifications. But the fact remains that they are being done and have created something of an institutional memory for those who want to take the time to use it. Thus, between educational and data bases, the groundwork of defense community history is in good shape. The service historical offices are having a measure of success in what they have set out to do—providing information and perspective in order to education their institutions.

More "Whys"

Surveys of official field historical programs generally concede their success and their contributions to uniformed commanders of agencies and functions in all the services. Most commanders, however, want more "whys"—more *explanation* of events—in their history. History and historians, of course, come in different shapes and sizes within these official programs (which include everything from annual chronologies to case studies to monographic efforts approaching von Rankian scholarship). The point here is that most official historians and their military bosses feel that the field programs are doing a good job. On the other hand, any number of footnoted comments to such surveys suggest some fascinating implications beyond statistical body-counts of success. Using them, it is possible to offer sets of historians' and commanders' "do's" on how history might even better help defense policymakers on both the field and headquarters levels.

Historians' "Do's"

For historians, "do's" would include the following:

(1) Be customer-oriented. Build your constituencies and be attentive to service.

(2) Get out of your office and be part of your unit. Feel the pulse of your orgaization and put it, where appropriate, in the history. Be aggressive and innovative. Be known, involved, available to your staff, and visible to the people in your unit.

(3) Sell history. Have a pamphlet or document(s) explaining your services, archival holdings, activities, and filing system. Have queries showing how history can help staff officers as well as a brief history of your organization. Have a briefing for the staff and for newcomers' orientation containing such material. Write an article occasionally for the base newpaper or have a display at base open houses. Press constantly—but tactfully—to get people to *use* history.

(4) Make every effort to explain "how" and "why" in your histories. Ask the commander and chief members of the staff "why" events occured, and make every effort to explain the events.

(5) Be conscious of history beyond your unit. Know the history of your base and some of the history of the local area, as well as the history of parent organizations within your service and the service, itself. Help with history-related questions, preservation, heritage, and with alumni groups in the local area.

(6) Write not just to satisfy higher authority, but above all be useful to your commander, to the staff, and to your service.

Commanders' "Do's"

Some of the initiative must come from the top. A set of commanders' "do's" would include:

(1) Emphasize the value of history on a regular basis in your commander's calls, your commander's conferences, and in staff meetings.

(2) Require your historian to brief incoming staff officers on the historical services available and encourage new staff members to read the last year or two of the history in their functional areas.

(3) Regularly in the decision-making process, encourage your staff to consult history to compare current problems and issues to ones in the past, and to find solutions developed or tried earlier.

(4) In order to provide perspectives on the "whys" of events, meet with the historian at least once in the writing cycle (if quarterly) or twice (if annual). Ask your deputy chiefs of staff to explain the "whys" of events to the historian, as well.

(5) Have the chief and deputy chiefs of staff review the history after it is written to fill in whatever "whys" are absent for their areas.

(6) If your historian does not receive a staff visit from a historian at a higher level, request such a visit. Every historical office should be visited regularly and its program—not just the history—assessed at least annually.

(7) Facilitate the automation of your history office where possible. With the exception of additional personnel, no other single change will help deal with the primary limitation on history in the services—the historian's time.

A Different Product for Policymakers?

It may be a different story for the defense community historical programs in Washington, although the "do's" obtain as much for the Pentagon as for Camp Swampy. With a certain degree of regularity, the tomes of official history emerge from the incubators of the chief historical offices. It requires time—anathema to the policymaker—and if production time is critical, so too is reader time, for the

official models are still those wonderfully rich and large "green books" of the Army's official history of World War II. This is not to say that "quickies" and monographs do not also form part of the product defense historians deliver to their superiors. But how useful they are, whether they appear in time to influence policy, and whether policymakers read them at all are open questions.

Perhaps the onus lies not with the policymakers but with the official historical community itself. There are enough words in print in the public history journals to indicate ways to correct the problem. Most official historians have long known the general solutions. Steven Diner has pointed out that there is "great potential demand for historical knowledge among persons concerned with contemporary policy issues, if the research is conceptualized, organized and written in a way that meets their needs"; and James Banner has added that "historians should at least experiment with new modes of presentation in order to meet. . .the policymaker's insistence upon relevance, clarity of information, and parsimony." Are they saying that the old models—the Army's green books, for example, or even the printed word—are obsolete? Will the shorter, more topically sensitive works of the U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute or the Office of Air Force History's "Project Warrior" and contract operational histories prove any more useful? That is, will anything newer and shorter be read? It is to be hoped that some happy medium between the old models and the newer attempts will emerge. Historians, however, will have to help them on their way. If, in fact, the defense community does have the capacity to use history more effectively (something upon which we all agree to some extent), the history will have to be *packaged* more innovatively, more attractively, less traditionally, and in a shorter response time.

Work I did several years ago with a colleague, Lt. Col. John A. Hixson, in response to a request from the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army, Europe, may suggest an alternate model. The general wanted information on how allied armies operated together in the past. Many military historians would style that coalition warfare, and thereby make their first mistake on this type of assignment. To the military professional, the general was talking about "allied interoperability." John and I went with the current military term. We provided the general with a conventional, short-fused monographic response on paper. It contained, to be sure, "lessons learned," text, diagrams, maps, footnotes, and bibliographic citations. We quickly discovered that something else was needed. We found it necessary to provide a sharp, issue-and-answer-oriented synopsis—an "executive-summary"—ala Diner-Banner. But we went farther, serving up a hard-hitting audiovisual briefing. With it, we gained entree into the inner circle of hard-working staff officers and workaholic subordinates who would actually use the data. We packaged a lecture/seminar-briefing using audiovisual materials and took it around to service schools. Taking it to allied military history offices analogous to our own, we discovered that our British, German, French, Belgian, and Dutch counterparts had yet to do any similar work in support of their own military policymakers.

Will any of our achievement in Europe of packaging our product for the policymakers be lasting? To the extent that official historical offices see lasting achievement as seminal history, no. Policy-serving historians should quickly disabuse themselves of such grand illusions. The reward may simply be that with the passage of time our allied interoperability study, its authors having passed into splendid anonymity, appears more and more frequently in the footnotes of studies by other people, both inside and outside the defense community. But then, is that not the educational process at its best?

Some Options

All this leads me to suggest three possible options by way of answer to the question of how we may help the defense community make better use of history in policymaking. *First*, priority should be given to nontraditional packaging, coupled with a willingness to proselytize a topic. The entreprenurial historian should not distain Madison Avenue approaches to selling his product within a targeted policy community. The approach will require time and teamwork between worker and manager in the producing historical agency, as it will much rethinking of how official history offices "market" their wares. It may meet with significant reluctance on the part of more traditional-minded senior historian partners. *Second*, historical offices should think in terms of two distinct—but related—types of product. The traditional, in-depth historical volumes can remain the flagship program, but they must be accompanied by analytical syntheses tailored to the needs of policymakers. Herein may lie opportunities for bridging the gap between official historians and their academic colleagues. The volumes could be written by the resident official historians; the syntheses or "executive summaries" might be accomplished through contracts with policy-oriented academics specializing in analytical—rather than narrative—historical work. Alternatively, depending upon the size of the historical office and its resources, a special section might be charged with the more analytical, short-fuse studies for the policymakers. The U.S.

Army Center of Military History's nascent Analysis Branch may provide an example of this regard. With both products, the traditional volumes and the studies designed for policymakers, historical offices should have an eye toward scholarship and accuracy, as well as anlaysis, synthesis, and clientele response.

The *third* option may be even more important: a more unified approach by defense historical offices. Obstacles and opposition to the creation of a unified defense historical office—under some "Czar of History"—have long been a feature of the official defense historical community. There can be no really useful historical contribution to defense policymaking today, however, unless a more unified approach is taken. Defense issues are integrated across service lines; the official history being written in Washington today is not. Service parochialism should not preclude the establishment of clear-cut joint or interservice historical teams to address specific and continuing defense issues. Such "crisis action," "policy response" or "rapid deployment" historical teams—to use some of the terms current in the defense community—could be set up to work within the five principal defense interest or mission areas: operations, institutions (organization), planning, technology (research and development, acquisition), and human (manning-training). Stalking the defense community, these teams could determine the issues of greatest policymaking concern, and the team members could provide historical input to an integrated, analytical product. In doing so, they could not only provide more timely response to the immediate needs of policymakers, but contribute to a general elevation of the historical consciousness of defense officials.

We should be under no illusions that making history more useful and palatable to policymakers is going to be an easy task. The principal problems, it must be admitted, will be with ourselves—the defense historical community. We are, after all, talking turf here. But has not official history already made the transition from mere chronical and court entertainment to the place where historians can function as team players with the policymakers? We are all educators by profession, and it does not take much foresight—given present and realistically anticipated realities—to see that more effective service to the defense policymakers will be in our own professional self-interest. But that it incidental—an added bonus. It will be in the interest of our services and the nation.

PRACTICING THE HISTORIAN'S CRAFT

The Army Historian and Army Records

James Gregory Bradsher

In the most fundamental of ways, Army records are at the heart of what should be Army historians' principal concern—how the Army's past can best be studied and used. Although this may seem obvious, there is a natural tendency to take a passive attitude toward these vital resources and their management, and to trust that the information will be preserved and available when it is needed. The tendency is justified to a degree; the Army has one of the best records management programs in the Federal government, and has had a relatively good record of caring for its records since 1775. During the last fifty years, the National Archives has provided extensive reference service on its Army records, and the Center of Military history and its predecessors have published a multitude of studies based upon them. These undisputed successes have made for a certain complacency among the records' users. But the nature of Army records is changing rapidly, with information being created, stored, and accessed by a variety of new means and in unprecedented volume. Without the proper creation, maintenance, and disposition of these records, the study of the Army's past can neither be undertaken nor applied. Army records management programs underway today will affect the way the Army's history is written and learned for generations to come. Military historians—and especially Army historians—need to take note of this and exercise some influence over how these programs are conceived and run.

At a minimum, an ability to influence how Army records are being handled means being cognizant of current Army records management policies, procedures, and practices; having a firm grasp of Army Regulation 340–18; and being aware of Federal statutes and regulations governing Federal records. It also means keeping up with technological appli-

cations to records. However much we might want to do all our research with paper records, we are not always going to be able to in the future. Historians can also strive toward closing the communication gaps between themselves, archivists, and records managers, people who speak the same language—history—in different dialects. One of the best ways Army historians can make their needs and concerns felt is through membership in such organizations as the Society for History in the Federal Government. Government historians must, through existing channels and through the creation of new mechanisms of communication within agencies, find ways to have their concerns considered in records management programs. Informed historians are better able, through advice and the identification of actual or potential problems, to make contributions to the Army's records management program.

The foundation of all Federal records management programs is the Federal Records Act of 1950. The act requires that the head of each agency ensure that records are created and preserved that adequately document its organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, and essential transactions. Although it would, of course, be impossible for the Secretary of the Army personally to guarantee that this happens, he oversees an excellent records management program that attempts to see that the Army complies with the law. This program issues regulations and offers advice, but it has its limitations and does not itself create documentation. The records themselves are, or should be, created by Department of the Army civilian and military personnel. How well are they doing? Unfortunately, in many cases we will not know until some day in the future, when historians are attempting to find records documenting some Army policy, decision, or operation. If historians want such documentation created and preserved, they must urge that the creators of Army information comply with both the letter and the spirit of the law.

Merely ensuring the creation of adequate documentation is only part of the Federal Records Act's adequacy requirement. To be useful to its creators and eventually to researchers, documentation needs to be properly maintained and preserved. This is especially true now that records are being stored by computers and on microforms. Although these technological advances offer great advantages in data storage and the retrieval of information, their use does intail some potential hazards. With the new technology, information can be erased in the twinkling of an eye. Historians should urge that valuable information stored in or on non-paper media be properly maintained so that it cannot be inadvertently lost or destroyed. Proper maintenance of records not only makes information easier to use, it makes it easier to identify and preserve records of permanent value, irrespective of media.

Army Regulation 340–18, "Office Mangement: The Army Functional Files System," promulgated by the Army and approved by the National Archives, identifies every series of Army records and provides for their disposition. Most Army records, like most in other Federal agencies, are temporary in nature. These records can be destroyed after a specified period of time when they no longer are of any administrative, legal, or fiscal value to the Army, the Federal government, or the public. Some temporary Army records, however, have a relatively long retention period, and should be retired to a Federal Records Center's records holding area when they are no longer current or active. The destruction or retirement of temporary records saves the Army storage space and makes it easier to find and use what files are retained. More importantly from the historian's point of view, destruction and retirement of temporary records allow the devotion of more attention to those records of permanent value.

Certain series of Army records have sufficient informational, evidential, or other values to warrant permanent retention. These records will eventually be accessioned into the National Archives and be made available to researchers. The fact that such a small proportion of Army records—less than ten percent—are judged by these criteria to be of permanent or enduring value makes it all the more important that they be carefully and fully created, properly maintained, and promptly retired when they become inactive. Prompt retirement of these records, aside from bringing to the Army the benefits derived from destroying or retiring temporary records, reduces the likelihood that they will be accidentally lost or destroyed. Only by being able to identify, on the basis of AR 340–18, what Army records series are permanent can historians help ensure that these resources are well-maintained until such time as they can get their hands on them.

The histories Army historians write tomorrow will be based upon documentation being created today. Knowledge of the Army's records management program, communication with archivists and records managers, and increased interest in how vital records are being handled will be a service to the Army, to Army historians, their profession, and the public.

Dr. Bradsher is an archivist in the National Archives and Records Administration.

Periodical Literature in English on the Study, Use, and Teaching of Military History

Hardpressed Army historians, civilian and military, are often asked to explain what it is that they and their colleagues do and can do for the Army. Most of us usually mumble something about learning from the past, often lacking the time to sit down and define with any precision what history in the Army means. Although bibliographies on military historical subjects abound, we have also lacked an up-to-date bibliography of periodical literature on how military history can be studied, used, and taught. The following list, taken primarily from military and historical journals throughout the English-speaking world, represents a wealth of shared ideas on the profession and its applications. *The Army Historian* prints it here for whatever use our colleagues can make of it. Additions and corrections from readers are more than welcome.

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B.D.H. and Robert K. Wright

AT THE CENTER

A New General

The Center of Military History is once again headed by an active duty general officer. Brig. Gen. William A. Stofft received his star in an August 8 ceremony officiated by Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh, Jr., and Army Chief of Staff General John A. Wickham, Jr.

Research Chair

Professor Daniel R. Beaver of the University of Cincinnati has assumed the first two-year U.S. Army Center of Military History Research Chair. Dr. Beaver, author of *Newton D. Baker and the American War Effort, 1917–1919* and other works, will be continuing work on the history of the supply function in the U.S. Army. The first volume of this two-volume study, covering the period through World War I, is scheduled for completion in July 1986. A second will be devoted to the period from World War I through 1947.

New Center Titles

Off the presses this summer were *The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Germany*, by Alfred M. Beck, *et al.*; the Army Lineage volume, *Air Defense Artillery*, compiled by Janice E. McKenney; Vincent C. Jones' *Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb*; and Capt. Frank Julia's *Historical Analysis Agencies Directory*.

MHD Workshop

The Center, in cooperation with the Forces Command historical office, conducted a special two-week workship July 13–27 at the Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. This was the second joint training session held for the seventeen (soon to be twenty) military history detachments in all three Army components. Workshops are held every three years to provide technical guidance and doctrine on wartime historical data collection. Many Center people assisted in the instruction at Carlisle.

Newly Arrived Professionals

Lt. Col. Charles R. Shrader arrived from the Italian Staff College to take over the Historical Services Division. Colonel Shrader, a Columbia University Ph.D., has long experience in the Army's history programs, including service in the Combat Studies Institute and the Military History Institute. R. Cody Phillips joined the Museum Branch as Deputy Chief Curator for Field Operations, after an assignment as Director of the Casemate Museum, Fort Monroe, Virginia. Other additions to the Center's professional staff this summer were Maj. Peter Kosumplik, who joined the Analysis Branch, and Maj. Cynthia Gurney, who has become the Center's historian on the Army Nurse Corps.

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COMMENTARY AND EXCHANGE

To the editors:

When humorist S. J. Perleman published his first book, Groucho Marx telegrammed his congratulations: "From the time I picked up your book until I set it down, I was convulsed with laughter. Someday I intend to read it."

More than a few command historians could identify with Perleman. I have often had misgivings about whether or not anyone was someday going to read our products. I wrestled with ponderous question of worth: Can military history live up to expectations? Can a commander turn to a monograph to find practical answers to his questions? I wasn't sure.

Then *The Army Historian* came along. Never has a professional journal been so welcome on my desk. It is important to reflect occasionally on the overall implications of your work, not so much for reassurances as for the chance to redefine your direction and purpose, to gain a systematic view of what it is that you are about.

TAH gives me an opportunity to think about some premises and basic concepts. Some examples of projects that have presented themselves as a direct result of stimulation by *The Army Historian* are summarized here:

—The "Commander and Military History" articles are reproduced for friends in command positions.

—The historians at this post are jointly sponsoring "The Huachuca Award for Historical Mindedness," a semi-annual historical essay contest with cash awards.

—In addition to trying to recreate a soldier's lifestyle in our museum displays, we are beginning to incorporate more military doctrine in our interpretation. For instance, a section on "The Lessons of the Apache Campaigns" is being added, using some of Russell Weigley's astute observations on this subject.

—A series of historical reenactments is in the works in which participants will be asked to imagine themselves in historical decision-making situations. The program will use microcomputer terminals.

—A museum space has been set aside to be converted into a "Historical Resources" room in which visitors can rest in a lounge atmosphere, watch specially produced video tapes, and browse through "recommended reading" bookshelves.

From the time I picked up *The Army Historian* until I set it down, I was engrossed with its import. Someday I intend to reread it.

JAMES P. FINLEY
Museum Director and Post Historian
Fort Huachuca, Arizona

Readers are invited to express their opinions on this publication and its featured articles, as well as to share their experiences and views on topics relating to the study, use, and teaching of military history. Correspondence should be addressed to the Editors, The Army Historian, *U.S. Army Center of Military History, 20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20314-0200.*

Drums & Trumpets Corner

This issue's selection from the evocative language of another time:

The scene was a terribly exciting one—musketry and cannon dealing death and destruction on all sides; men grappling with men in a fearful death-struggle; column after column rushing eagerly up, ambitious to obtain a post of danger; officers riding hither and thither in the thickest of the fight, urging their men on, and encouraging them to greater exertions; regiments charging into the very jaws of death with frightful yells and shouts, more effective, as they fell upon the ears of the enemy than a thousand rifle-balls—and, in the midst of all, is heard one long loud, continuous round of cheering as the Star-Spangled-Banner is unfurled in the face of the foe, and defiantly supplants the mongrel colors that had, but a moment before, designated the spot as Rebel ground.

The Chicago Journal, quoted in Horace Greeley, *The American Conflict: A History of the Great Rebellion in the United States of America, 1860–64: Its Causes, Incidents, and Results: Intended to Exhibit Especially Its Moral and Political Phases, with the Drift and Progress of American Opinion Respecting Human Slavery from 1776 to the Close of the War for the Union* (Hartford, Conn.: O.D. Case & Co., 1864), I: 596.

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